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Importance of Memory Error Exploits
 Memory error exploits continue to be the dominant threat
 Behind most “critical updates” from Microsoft and other vendors
 Mechanism of choice in “mass market” attacks, including worms
 Defense techniques to address this problem continues to be 
the hot topic of research
 Over 20 techniques have been invented so far
 Techniques that provide full protection haven’t been practical
 High performance cost
 Code compatibility issues
 Diversity based defenses emerging as more promising
 Address Space Randomization (ASR)
 Instruction Set Randomization (ISR)
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Previous Diversity Based Techniques
Runtime performance overheads
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PointGuard
ASR (with AAR)
ASR (with AAR+RAR)
ISR
RAR: Relative Address Randomization
AAR: Absolute Address Randomization
Randomizes code 
representation
Targets only foreign 
code execution
Randomizes pointer 
representation
Targets control data 
attacks
Has code 
compatibility issues 
and is unsound
Randomizes 
absolute addresses
Targets control 
data attacks
Randomizes absolute 
and relative addresses
Targets control and 
non-control data attacks
DSR 
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DSR Technique
 Basic idea:  randomize data representation
 Xor each data object with a distinct random mask
 Effect of data corruption becomes non-deterministic
 Example: use out-of-bounds access on array X1 to corrupt variable 
X2 with value V
– Actual value written: mask(X1)  V
– When X2 is read, its value interpreted as mask(X2)  (mask(X1)  V)
– mask(X2)  mask(X1)  V ≠ V (because mask(X2) ≠ mask(X1) )
X1 X2
Example: Buffer overflow
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Differences with PointGuard
 DSR randomizes all data objects, not just pointers
 PointGuard breaks working programs, DSR doesn’t
 Attacks targeted:
 PointGuard targets absolute address-dependent attacks 
(pointer corruption)
 DSR targets relative address-dependent attacks
 Helps defeating non-control data attacks that corrupt files names, 
userids, command names, authentication data, …
 Automatically defeats absolute address-dependent attacks as 
pointer corruption step is relative address-dependant
 Unlike PointGuard, DSR is not vulnerable to information 
leakage attacks (details forthcoming)
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DSR Transformation Approach
 For each variable v, introduce another variable m_v for 
storing its mask
 Randomize values assigned to variables (LHS)
 Example:   x = 5              x = 5; x = x ^ m_x;
 Derandomize used variables (RHS)
 Example:  (x + y)             ((x ^ m_x) + (y ^ m_y))
 Key problem: aliasing
int x, y, *ptr; …
ptr = &x; …
ptr = &y; …
z = *ptr
 Unfortunately, we cannot statically determine the mask 
associated with *ptr – it could be that of x or y
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Aliasing Problem
 Solution to aliasing problem: assign the same 
randomization mask to possibly aliased objects
 Requires alias analysis
 Current implementation supports Steensgaard’s algorithm for  
alias analysis
 Flow-insensitive
 Context-insensitive
 Field-insensitive
 All heap objects allocated at the same point represented by a single 
logical object
 Linear time complexity
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Pointer Analysis & Mask Assignment
int intval;
int *p1,*p2,*p3;
int **pp1,**pp2;
p1  = &intval;
pp1 = &p1;...
pp1 = &p3;...
pp2 = pp1;
p2  = *pp2;
…
= &pp2;
pp2
pp1 
p1,p3
intval
P2
mask: m1
mask: m2
mask: m3
p2 = *p 2
p2 = *(pp2^m3)^m2;
p2 = pp2^m4;
mask: m4
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Optimization
 Basic idea: mask only overflow candidate objects (OCOs),
e.g., arrays, structures containing arrays, objects whose 
addresses are taken
 Optimization is very effective because majority of memory 
access in a typical program are to non-OCOs
 Ensure that optimization doesn’t significantly impact security
 Claim: all data corruptions involve overflows from OCOs
 All relative address-dependent attacks involve overflows from 
OCOs
 All absolute address-dependent attacks involve corruption of 
pointers
 Require a relative address-dependent step, e.g., buffer overflow, 
integer overflow, heap overflow, etc.
 Implication: need protection from overflows in OCOs
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Protection from Overflows in OCOs  (Optimization ctd)
 Protect non-OCOs from overflows in OCOs
 Non-OCOs separated from OCOs with an unmapped memory 
page
 Guard against overflows among OCOs
 Use of distinct masks provides automatic protection for 
overflows between unaliased OCOs
 Prevent overflows between aliased OCOs by allocating them in 
disjoint memory regions
 Stack: allocate local OCOs on disjoint stacks (buffer stacks) if small 
in number; allocate in heap if the number is high
 Static: number of disjoint memory areas statically known
 Heap:  heap OCOs allocations (typically large in number) randomly 
distributed in a fixed number of heap memory regions
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Implementation
 Based on source-to-source transformation of C programs
 Uses CIL as front-end and OCAML as implementation language
 Implementation issues
 Handling overflows within structures
 Use field-sensitive pointer analysis so as to assign distinct mask to 
each field of a structure (not done yet)
 Handle functions such as memcpy, bzero in a context-sensitive way
 Handling variable argument functions
 Treat them as if they take array (with maximum size limit) parameter
 Transformation of libraries
 Source code available: need dynamic mask resolution
 Source code unavailable: need summary functions for library calls
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Effectiveness Against Various Attacks
 Stack buffer overflows
 Overflows to corrupt data on main stack (e.g., return address, 
based pointer, saved registers) fail
 Overflows among overflow candidate objects
 fail if source and target objects are in different buffer stack or 
disjoint memory regions
 succeed with probability 2-32 otherwise
 Static buffer overflows
 Overflows to corrupt non overflow candidate objects fail
 Overflows between overflow candidate objects 
 fail if source and target objects are in different memory regions
 succeed with probability 2-32 otherwise
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Effectiveness Against Various Attacks
 Heap overflows
 Traditional attack (corruption of heap control data) succeeds 
with probability  2-32
 An overflow from one heap block to the next succeeds with 
probability > 2-32 (property of a program)
 Heap objects randomly distributed
 Nonetheless, such overflows also detected when control data 
between the heap blocks get corrupted
 Format string attacks
 Traditional attack with %n directive fails
 DSR cannot stop attacks that print contents of stack with %x
 Relative address attacks based on integer overflows
 If source and target objects share the same mask, such attacks 
can be successful (protection provided in the form of RAR)
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Effectiveness Against Attacks targeting DSR
 Information leakage attacks
 If a masked data is leaked, an attacker can deduce the mask if 
the plaintext data value is known
 Attempt to read masked data results in reading plaintext data
 Brute force and guessing attacks
 become difficult because of low probability of success 
 Partial pointer overwrites
 become impossible on stack-resident data because the main 
stack does not contain overflow candidate objects 
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Related Work
 Runtime guarding: StackGuard, StackShield, RAD, Libsafe, 
Libverify, ProPolice, FormatGuard, …
 Attack specific, no comprehensive protection
 Runtime bounds and pointer checking: [Austin+94], 
[Jones+97], Cyclone, CCured, [Ruwase+04], [Xu+04], 
[Dhurjati et al 06]
 High overheads or incompatibility with legacy code
 Runtime enforcement of static analysis results: CFI, DFI, 
WIT
 Don’t target all exploits (e.g., data leakage/corruption) 
 Randomization techniques: ASR (PaX, [Bhatkar+03], 
[Xu+03]), ISR ([Barrantes+03], [Kc+03]), PointGuard
 No or limited protection from non-control data attacks
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Summary of Contributions
 Randomization of all types of data provides comprehensive 
coverage
 Control data attacks
 Non-control data attacks
 Unlike other randomization techniques, resistant to 
information leakage attacks
 Higher range of randomization than other randomization 
techniques
 Capable of detecting exploits that are missed by full bounds-
checking techniques
 Example: overflows within structures
 Low runtime overhead
 Average around 15%
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Thank You!
R.Sekar
Email: sekar@cs.sunysb.edu
